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August 1, 2013 / compassioninpolitics

Philosophers Who Critique Materialism

Note these are just philosophers which challenge or critique materialism in some way–they may not be Christian–and in fact many probably aren’t

E. J Lowe
Uwe Meixner
Martine Nida-Rumelin
Mario De Caro
Angus JL Menuge
Robert C. Koons
George Bealer
Laurence BonJour
Eli Hirsch
Adam Pautz
Charles Siewert
Stephern L White

Alternatives to Materialism
Joseph Almog
Terry Horgan
Michael Jubien
Brian Leftlow

Their blog goes further:

Bertrand Russell, Rudolf Carnap, Alonzo Church, Kurt Gödel, Nelson Goodman, Paul Grice, Stuart Hampshire, Roderick Chisholm, Benson Mates, Peter Strawson, Hilary Putnam, John Searle, Jerrold Katz, Alvin Plantinga, Charles Parsons, Jaegwon Kim, George Myro, Thomas Nagel, Robert Adams, Hugh Mellor, Saul Kripke, Eli Hirsch, Ernest Sosa, Stephen Schiffer, Bas van Fraassen, John McDowell, Peter Unger, Derek Parfit, Crispin Wright, Laurence BonJour, Michael Jubien, Nancy Cartwright, Bob Hale, Kit Fine, Tyler Burge, Terence Horgan, ColinMcGinn, Robert Brandom, Nathan Salmon, Joseph Levine, TimothyWilliamson, Mark Johnston, Paul Boghossian, Stephen Yablo, Joseph Almog, Keith DeRose, Tim Crane, John Hawthorne, Richard Heck, David Chalmers.

For all the people listed, we have documentation that they either rejected materialism or harbored serious and specific doubts about its ultimate viability. All the living philosophers listed (Putnam, Searle, Plantinga, Parsons, Kim, Nagel, and all those following) have given us explicit permission to include them on the list (under the description used in the sentence preceding this one). Limitations on space prevent us from giving a thorough presentation of citations; in the Bibliography, however, we cite relevant works by many of these philosophers. A comment about Russell and Carnap will be helpful here. Russell espoused, at different times, phenomenalism and robust neutral monism, each of which is antithetical to Reductive Materialism and also to the thesis that physical properties are metaphysically prior to—and hence are a supervenience base for—mental properties. See, e.g., Russell (1956). The young Carnap (of the Aufbau) was a phenomenalist. The mature Carnap (of ‘Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology’) endorsed a form of anti-realism incompatible with the sort of materialism prominent over the course of the last sixty or so years. Like the young Carnap, Nelson Goodman and Benson Mates were also phenomenalists, not materialists.

You can find the book, The Waning of Materialism here.

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